U.S. 33, 50] A. denied, they are not unlimited," Whitcomb v. Chavis, ] As we discuss infra, at 45, 28 U.S.C. Footnote 10 The District Court orders in this case suggest the pitfalls of the first course. process by preventing a local government from implementing that remedy. (c) The modifications are not invalid under the Tenth Amendment, since that Amendment's reservation of nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a federal court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment. 1983, the District Court found that the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) and petitioner State had operated a segregated school system within the KCMSD. To hold otherwise would fail to take account of the obligations of local governments, under the Supremacy Clause, to fulfill the requirements that the Constitution imposes on them. had resigned their office no one remained on whom the mandamus could operate). This case thus stands in contrast to United States v. Buljubasic, supra, where the Court of Appeals allowed the mandate to issue even though the appellant had filed a "Petition for Rehearing En Banc." U.S. 33, 37]. Moreover, the petition for certiorari in this case included the contention that the District Court should not have considered the power to tax before considering whether its choice of remedy was the only possible way to achieve desegregation as a part of its argument on Question 2, which the Court granted. The Court states that the KCMSD was "invested with authority to collect and disburse the property tax." The District Court concluded that it would be "clearly inequitable" to require the population of KCMSD to pay half of the desegregation cost, and that "even with Court help it would be very difficult for the KCMSD to fund more than 25% of the costs of the entire remedial plan." Healthy City Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, Team Assignment (Teams DH): Please write a short memorandum (3-5 pages) considering whether the Supreme Court's decision in the two Missouri v. Jenkins cases are consistent or inconsistent. 78, p. 523 (J. Cooke ed. [ The Kansas City Desegregation Case. 433 Justice Souter dissented in this case and argued that the majoritys holding limiting the district courts remedial authority was contrary to the precedent established in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 377 The Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit enhancement of a fee award under 1988 against a State to compensate for delay in payment. 1. Missouri v. Jenkins provides a good starting point for examin-ing the role of the judiciary in sculpting, implementing, and moni-toring a remedial plan for desegregation. Our cases throughout the years leave no doubt that taxation is not a judicial function. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply. The judicial taxation approved by the Eighth Circuit is also without parallel. Brief for Respondents at 7, Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990) (No. Opinion Announcement - April 18, 1990, Board of Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall. . App. (1942), it has been the consistent practice of the Court to treat petitions for rehearing timely presented to the Courts of Appeals as tolling the start of the period in which a petition for certiorari must be sought until rehearing is denied or a new judgment is entered on the rehearing. U.S. 294, 300 (1988). 491 U.S. 358, 368 330 Id., at 685. See, e. g., United States v. Buljubasic, 828 F.2d 426 (CA7 1987). See Mo. The State argues that the funding ordered by the District Court violates principles of equity and comity because the remedial order itself was excessive. U.S. 33, 47] Footnote 2 Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. As the Court describes it, the local KCMSD possesses plenary taxing powers, which allow it to impose any tax it chooses if not "hinder[ed]" by the Missouri Constitution and state statutes. Three months later, the District Court adopted a plan requiring $187,450,334 in further capital improvements. This final iteration of the Missouri v. Jenkins cases (this case is deemedMissouri v. Jenkins III) marks the end of the Courts involvement in the 18-year-long litigation. 13 . [495 In Von Hoffman, the limitation was disregarded because of the Contract Clause. [ KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR and SCALIA, JJ., joined, post. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on August 19, 1988. 2101(c) requires that a petition for certiorari in a civil case be filed within 90 days after the entry of the judgment sought to be reviewed. 377 Use this button to switch between dark and light mode. Finally, the State argues that an order to increase taxes cannot be sustained under the judicial power of Article III. This is not an accurate description. . 100, 110-111 (1968); see also Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., ] The District Court authorized $12,972,727 for operation of the six magnet schools and $12,877,330 for further capital improvements at those schools. See Louisiana ex rel. When it was subsequently brought to the Eighth Circuit's attention that it had neglected to refer to those papers in its order as petitions for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing in banc, the court amended its order nunc pro tunc to ensure that the order reflected the reality of the action taken on October 14. In rejecting the KCMSD's request, the District Court left in effect the $4 rate it had established in its October 27, 1987, order. similarly styled petitions by other parties seeking to intervene, and issued its mandate. The courts held that the state of Missouri was liable for segregated schools within the boundaries of KCMSD. (1947). The KCMSD plan adopted by the court provided that "every senior high school, every middle school, and approximately one-half of the elementary schools in the KCMSD will become magnet schools by the school year 1991-92." See Heine v. Levee Commissioners, 19 Wall. I do not acknowledge the troubling departures in today's majority opinion as either necessary or appropriate to ensure full compliance with the Equal Protection Clause and its mandate to eliminate the cause and effects of racial discrimination in the schools. It held that both orders exceeded the District Courts authority, as they went beyond the nature and scope of the school districts initial constitutional violation. (1977), the District Court found this insufficient. Ferguson Reorganized School Dist. 41 ("nothing in the record to suggest" that tax limitation was intended to frustrate desegregation) with Griffin, supra, at 221 (State Constitution amended as part of state and school district plan to resist desegregation). Footnote 18 U.S. 406 This interdistrict goal is beyond the scope of the intradistrict violation identified by the District Court. U.S. 274 Id., at 470-488. We presume that the Eighth Circuit withheld the mandate See 855 F.2d, at 1318 (Lay, C. J., concurring and dissenting); Brief for Icelean Clark et al. The State of Missouri and Kansas City students had been involved in an 18-year-long. of Equalization, See App. Taxation by a legislature raises no due process concerns, for the citizens'"rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule." 138-142. . "The Tenth Amendment's reservation of nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment." National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. United States, Fields, Assistant Attorney General, and David R. Boyd. 443 United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Citation 491 US 274 (1989) Argued Feb 21, 1989 Decided Jun 19, 1989 Advocates Bruce Farmer Assistant Attorney General of Missouri, argued the cause for the petitioners Jay Topkis argued the cause for the respondents Facts of the case Id., at 1310-1311; see Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294 (in banc), cert. v. Rodriguez. This case involves an 18-year long litigation regarding school segregation in the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD). Const., Art. U.S. 212, 215 489-502. The State's filing on its face did not exactly comport with any of these options. The State appealed, challenging the scope of the desegregation remedy, the allocation of the cost between the State and KCMSD, and the tax increase. Decided April 18, 1990. Indeed, it may be that a mere 12-acre petting farm, or other corresponding reductions in court-ordered spending, might satisfy constitutional requirements, while preserving scarce public funds for legislative allocation to other public needs, such as paving streets, feeding the poor, building prisons, or housing the homeless. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, Id., at 413. U.S. 744 U.S. 33, 72] The power to exact a higher rate of property tax remains with the people, a majority of whom must agree to empower the KCMSD to increase the levy up to $3.75 per $100, and two-thirds of whom must agree for the levy to go higher. The district itself is over two-thirds black, so it is unsurprising that some of the schools are also predominately black. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed those orders. Id., at 145a-146a (emphasis in original). 35, 28 U.S.C. 317 As the Eighth Circuit judges dissenting from denial of rehearing in banc put it: "The remedies ordered go far beyond anything previously seen in a school desegregation case. 433 U.S. Supreme CourtMissouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989). 9th Circuit. [ v. Missouri, App. A district court may not create an intra-district segregation remedial plan with the purpose of attracting nonminority students into the district. Other Circuits routinely treat documents so labeled Case Brief Missouri v. Jenkins (1989) 491 U.S. 274, 109 S.Ct. The Understanding Law Video Lecture Series: Monthly Subscription ($19 / Month) In November 1986, the District Court endorsed a marked expansion of the magnet school program. Rule App. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Missouri_v._Jenkins&oldid=1063285610, United States Supreme Court cases of the Rehnquist Court, United States school desegregation case law, Short description is different from Wikidata, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License 3.0. appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. . to Pet. (1977), and does not afford local school boards like KCMSD immunity from suit, Mt. The method of taxation endorsed by today's dicta suffers the same flaw, for a district court order that overrides the citizens' state-law protection against taxation without referendum approval can in no sense provide representational due process. It comes as no surprise that the cost of this approach to the remedy far exceeded KCMSD's budget, or for that matter, its authority to tax. neither attempted to restructure local governmental entities nor . ", This case is a stark illustration of the ever-present question whether ends justify means. KCMSD requested that the District Court order the State to pay for any amount that KCMSD could not meet. (1971). U.S. 187, 196 , we stated that the enforcement of a money judgment against the State did not violate principles of federalism because "[t]he District Court . District courts can and must take needed steps to eliminate racial discrimination and ensure the operation of unitary school systems. Since Department of Banking of Nebraska v. Pink, Brief for Petitioner at 15-16. If we had accepted the State's broader, foundational question going to the magnet school concept, we could also have made an informed decision on whether that element of the District Court's remedial scheme was within the limits of the Court's equitable discretion in response to the constitutional . The court then directed KCMSD to "approve a property tax levy rate for 1989 at a later date when financial calculations for the 1989-1990 school year are clear and submit the proposed levy rate to the Court for approval at that time." CV 09-06731 SS. Supp., at 412-413. Kansas City, Missouri, School Dist. Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to rule that KCMSD should be responsible for funding its share of the remedy. v. JENKINS ET AL. This exception also has no application to this case, where there are state and local officials invested with authority to collect and disburse the property tax and where, as matters now stand, the District Court need only prevent those officials from applying state law that would interfere with the willing levy of property taxes by KCMSD. Get free summaries of new US Supreme Court opinions delivered to your inbox! (1906) (where state municipality enters into a bond obligation based on delegated state power to collect a tax, State may not by subsequent abolition of the municipality remove the taxing power; such an act is itself invalid as a violation of the Contracts Clause); Wolff v. New Orleans, of Oral Arg. However wide the discretion of local authorities in fashioning desegregation remedies may be, "if a state-imposed limitation on a school authority's discretion operates to inhibit or obstruct the operation of a unitary school system or impede the disestablishing of a dual school system, it must fall; state policy must give way when it operates to hinder vindication of federal constitutional guarantees." U.S. 218, 233 70, 98 L.Ed.2d 34 (1987). See United States v. New Orleans, 5 [ Date: July 25, 2021 To: Professor Jason DeVaux From: Victoria Y. Rosebeary Case: Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) Facts: In an action under 42 U.S.C. . Last Term we rejected the invitation to cure an unconstitutional tax scheme by broadening the class of those taxed. The State was then ordered to increase the property taxes to pay for costs of desegregating KCMSD. United States United States District Courts. However, the trust fund is allocated according to a formula that does not compensate KCMSD for the amount lost in property tax revenues, and the effect of Proposition C is to divert nearly half of the sales taxes collected in KCMSD to other parts of the State. After KCMSD was realigned as a defendant, a group of students filed an amended complaint that also alleged intradistrict segregation. U.S. 248 . 14. 102 [495 By no means should a district court grant local government carte blanche, cf. 18 The taxes were imposed by a District Court that was not "representative" in any sense, and the individual citizens of the KCMSD whose property (they later learned) was at stake were neither served with process nor heard in court. Id., at 30, 33. Mo. The suggestion that our limited grant of certiorari requires us to decide this case blinkered as to the actual remedy underlying it, ante, at 53, is ill founded. See Price & Stern, Magnet Schools as a Strategy for Integration and School Reform, 5 Yale L. & Policy Rev. Email Address: denied sub nom. Advocates. Const., Art. [495 of Education of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., 836 F.2d 986 (1987), cert. of Education v. Swann, See 672 F. As a segregation remedial order, a federal court ordered Missouri (Defendant) to fund raises for teachers and staff in the Kansas City Metropolitan School District and to fund magnet programs. As the Court chooses to discuss the question of future taxation, however, I must state my respectful disagreement with its analysis and conclusions on this vital question. The plan also included a "25 acre farm and 25 acre wildland area" for science study. denied sub nom. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. U.S. 265, 280 Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) MISSOURI ET AL. U.S. 816 U.S. 33, 40] On January 10, 1989, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals issued an amended order, recalling the October 14 mandate and entering nunc pro tunc effective October 14 an order denying the three "petitions for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing en banc." The idea that integration is the only way that black children can learn suggests that black children are inferior to white children. The State's argument that federal courts cannot set aside state-imposed limitations on local taxing authority because that requires local governments to do more than exercise the power that is theirs has been rejected, Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. Absent a change in state law, the tax is imposed by federal authority under a federal decree. at 111a, and that apportionment of damages between the State and KCMSD according to fault was supported by the doctrine of comparative fault in tort, which had been adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court in Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S. W. 2d 11 (1983). Footnote 20 281 (1977). The ultimate inquiry is whether the constitutional violator has complied in good faith with the decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable. In 1977, KCMSD and a group of KCMSD students filed a complaint alleging that the State of Missouri and surrounding school districts had operated a segregated public school system in the Kansas City metropolitan area. . Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., But this broad suggestion does not follow from the holding in Von Hoffman. U.S. 33, 58] The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Rehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Souter, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, This page was last edited on 2 January 2022, at 04:55. The district court then instead named the KCMSD school district as a defendant. [495 210 It is true that in Milliken v. Bradley, Proceedings before the District Court continued during the appeal. (1879); Heine v. Levee It is true that the Court of Appeals went on "to consider the procedures which the district court should use in the future." [495 -259 (1953). It is therefore clear that a local government with taxing authority may be ordered to levy taxes in excess of the limit set by state statute where there is reason based in the Constitution for not observing the statutory limitation. The very cases cited by the majority show that a federal court has no such authority. judicial power. [ Instead, the court and the KCMSD decided to make a magnet of the district as a whole. 1983, the District Court found that the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) and petitioner State had operated a segregated school system within the KCMSD. The District Court here did consider alternatives to the taxing measures it imposed, but only funding alternatives. Rather, the cases show that where a limitation on the local authority's taxing power is not a subsequent enactment itself in violation of the Contracts Clause, a federal court is without power to order a tax levy that goes beyond the authority granted by state law. for Cert. officials from applying state law that would interfere with the willing levy of property taxes by KCMSD," ante, at 56, n. 20, cause the KCMSD to exercise power under state law. U.S. 33, 73] Footnote 13 376 (1861). Get free summaries of new US Supreme Court opinions delivered to your inbox! On January 10, 1989, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals issued an amended order, recalling the October 14 mandate and entering nunc pro tunc, effective October 14, an order denying the three "petitions for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing en banc." -55 (1973). Rule App. As I discuss below, I do not think this possibility is in reality a significant one. The difference between the two approaches is far more than a matter of form. For this reason, no order of taxation has ever been approved. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 276 (1989) (Jenkins I). After a lengthy trial, the District Court found that KCMSD and the State had operated a segregated school system within the KCMSD. . The statutory limitation, therefore, could be disregarded and the city ordered to levy the necessary taxes to pay its bonds. U.S. 582 855 F.2d, at 1318. for Cert. In such cases, of which Pink was one, "no . has no influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever." rehearing in banc, unlike a petition for rehearing, "shall not affect the finality of the judgment of the court of appeals or stay the issuance of the mandate.". [495 Griffin endorsed the power of a federal court to order the local authority to exercise existing authority to tax. Missouri appealed, arguing that the district courts orders exceeded its remedial authority. Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (1986) (in banc). 433 Oct 30, 1989. (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). Peter S. Hendrixson filed a brief for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as amicus curiae urging affirmance. In civil cases, applications for extension of time must be presented during the original 90-day period. The State challenged the District Courts order. [ was avowedly directed against the power of the States," Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., The Court of Appeals thus required that in the future, the District Court should not set the property tax rate itself but should authorize KCMSD to submit a levy to the state tax collection authorities and should enjoin the operation of state laws hindering KCMSD from adequately funding the remedy. In movant's brief . [495 The District Court's school desegregation orders, which required the State of Missouri to fund across-the-board salary increases and to continue to fund remedial education programs, went beyond the court's remedial authority. The scope of the desegregation order was also upheld against all the State's objections, id., at 1301-1307, as was the allocation of costs, id., at 1307-1308. Respondents argue that the original order is more probative of the Eighth Circuit's contemporaneous treatment of the State's petition, and they contend that order clearly does not treat the petition as requesting panel rehearing. U.S. 267, 290 [495 1983, the District Court found that the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) and petitioner State had operated a segregated school system within the KCMSD. The operation of tax systems is among the most difficult aspects of public administration. Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 515, List of United States Supreme Court cases, Lists of United States Supreme Court cases by volume, List of United States Supreme Court cases by the Rehnquist Court, "Money And School Performance: Lessons from the Kansas City Desegregation Experiment", "Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989)", "Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990)". The Court of Appeals affirmed most of the initial order, but ordered the lower court to divide the remedy's cost equally between the entities. X, 1 (political subdivisions may exercise only "[tax] power granted to them" by Missouri General Assembly). Id., at 112a. 1983. The Court's statements, in my view, cannot be seen as necessary for its judgment, or as precedent for the future, and I cannot join Parts III and IV of the Court's opinion. 469 The Court held that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the tax increase, which contravened the principles of comity. One of the would-be intervenors filed with this Court an application for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari 78 days after the issuance of the order denying rehearing and 134 days after the entry of the Court of Appeals' judgment. 1978), and KCMSD filed a cross-claim against the State, seeking indemnification for any liability that might be imposed on KCMSD for intradistrict segregation. . Although we have approved desegregation plans involving magnet schools of this conventional definition, see Milliken v. Bradley, (1980). WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III and IV, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. 415 But it is misleading to suggest that a failure to fund this particular remedy would leave constitutional rights without a remedy. This case clearly reveals a Court majority attempting to place parameters around what was once a relatively broad view of a federal courts ability to cure the ills of past racial discrimination. The "Hancock Amendment" requires property tax rates to be rolled back when property is assessed at a higher valuation to ensure that taxes will not be increased solely as a result of reassessments. U.S. 358 . While the court below, unlike other Courts of Appeals, does not have a published practice of treating all suggestions for rehearing in banc as containing both petitions for rehearing and suggestions for rehearing in banc, this Court will not assume that the court's action in this case is not in accord with its regular practice. en banc are denied." In addition to the MLA, Chicago, and APA styles, your school, university, publication, or institution may have its own requirements for citations. As was said in another context, "[t]he very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a . ." to Pet. U.S. 33, 51]. U.S. 1206 this case, the State styled its filing as a "Petition for Rehearing En Banc." . Any purported distinction between direct imposition of a tax U.S. 472, 501 U.S. 622, 625 [2] Then, in 1990, the Supreme Court addressed whether a federal court could order a local government to raise taxes above the state statute amount to cover the cost of removing the "vestiges of discrimination." Jenkins cases (this case is deemed Missouri v. Jenkins III) marks the end of the Court's involvement in the 18-year-long litigation. By this I do not mean that the remedy is, as we assume this one was, within the broad discretion of the district court. Did the District Court exceed its constitutional authority by ordering salary increases of instructional and non-instructional employees of the KCMSD? For this reason, I reject the artificial suggestion that the District Court may, by "prevent[ing] . U.S. 33, 77] Footnote 4 R-2 v. United States, [495 address. The District Court ordered an extensive capital improvement program to rehabilitate the deteriorating physical plant of KCMSD, the cost of which was estimated as at least $37 million, of which $27 million was to be contributed by the State. U.S. 274, 280 They insist that the Eighth Circuit cannot, post hoc, amend its order to make it appear that it took an action which it never took. Law School Case Brief Missouri v. Jenkins - 495 U.S. 33, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990) Rule: Remedial powers of an equity court must be adequate to the task, but they are not unlimited, and one of the most important considerations governing the exercise of equitable power is a proper respect for the integrity and function of local government institutions. You can opt out at any time by clicking the unsubscribe link in our newsletter, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action (BAMN). [ JENKINS 495 U.S. 33 (1990) Jenkins produced a unanimous result but with two sharply differing opinions on an important question concerning the power of federal courts to remedy school desegregation. 93-1823. . 433 113a. Proc. One of the most troubling aspects of the Court's opinion is that discussion of the important constitutional issues of judicial authority to tax need never have been undertaken to decide this case. U.S. 33, 74] 344 855 F.2d, at 1318-1319. The District Court took no action to reverse its tax increase through fiscal year 1988-1989. It is accepted by all the parties, as it was by the courts below, that the imposition of a tax increase by a federal court was an extraordinary event. We have approved desegregation orders using assignment changes and some ancillary education programs to ensure the operation of a unitary school system for the district's children. To suggest that a constitutional violation will go unremedied if a district does not, though capital improvements or other means, turn every school into a magnet school, and the entire district into a magnet district, is to suggest that the remedies approved in our past cases should have been disapproved as insufficient to deal with the violations. An order of this type would find support in the Griffin dicta and present a closer question than the one before us. We granted certiorari, 488 U.S. 888 (1988), to resolve two questions relating to fees litigation under 90 Stat. There a municipality had authorized a tax levy in support of a specific bond obligation, but later limited the taxation authority in a way that impaired the bond obligation. The mandate of the Court of Appeals issued on October 14. But courage and skill must be exercised with due regard for the proper and historic role of the courts. 433 U.S. 33, 46] 1341, as the injunction would require the collection of additional taxes, not inhibit the collection of taxes. The Court cites a single case, Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. ] See Tr. Before taking such a drastic step the District Court was obliged to assure itself that no permissible alternative would have accomplished the required task.
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